We examine wages in Australia under federally-registered individual contracts and collective agreements using unpublished data from a national earnings survey. The distribution of earnings under registered individual contracts was more unequal than under collective agreements. Average and median earnings under registered individual contracts were lower than under collective agreements. There was little evidence that individual contracting raised wages through raising productivity. The link between contracting and pay appears contingent, varying between occupations, industries and firm size bands, and dependent upon employees' position in the labour market and employers' use of union avoidance strategies.
The general direction of change in Australia was consistent with the spirit of policies advocated for some time by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which praised Australia for 'its remarkable progress from a very unsatisfactory starting point' (OECD 2004a) . Many labour market reforms were in keeping with the 1994 OECD Jobs Study's strategy (OECD 1994) . Australia was 'among the OECD countries complying best' with it (OECD 2001: 14) . Amongst other things, Australian reforms aimed to: increase working time flexibility; boost employment participation by changing the welfare system; and further decentralise and individualise wage bargaining to increase wage flexibility. More recently, the OECD has hedged its position somewhat regarding policy effects. Its 2004 Employment Outlook indicated its previously asserted link between high or compressed wage structures and lower employment had 'plausibility' but the evidence was 'fragile' (OECD 2004b:165) . Is 2006 Employment Outlook, analysing econometric literature, observed: the effect of employment protection legislation on overall unemployment 'was probably small'; most studies found no significant union impact on overall labour market performance; a high degree of corporatism (centralisation) was associated with lower unemployment; and evidence on the link between minimum wages and employment was 'ambiguous'. All these findings were confirmed by its own econometric analysis (OECD 2006b: 96,84,85,86,212,217) . While observing that several countries with highly regulated labour markets and active labour market programs (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) had on average better employment rates than 'market reliant' countries such as the UK, USA, Australia and New Zealand, and conceding 'there is no single combination of policies and institutions to achieve and maintain good labour market performance', the OECD continued to advocate 'flexible working-time arrangements' and 'wage flexibility', with qualifications (OECD 2006a: 18,12,13) . Such nuances in OECD analysis were not reflected in Australian government policy in the development and implementation of the 'WorkChoices' reforms. (Cowling & Mitchell 2006) .
In this paper we use unpublished Australian data from a national earnings survey to understand the patterns, trends and effects of individual wage bargaining. How has individual bargaining affected wage relativities at particular levels including national, industry, occupational, firm and between men and women? Has individualisation promoted higher wages through improved productivity growth at national and industry levels? Is there a link between the wage effects of individualisation and management strategies regarding unions? In privileging individual bargaining over collective bargaining, the Australian industrial relations system provides a unique opportunity for this type of study. Rubery (1997) notes that wages serve three broad functions: (a) price allocation; (b) social stratification/social cohesion; and (c) management tool. The price allocation function (the traditional OECD position), discussed earlier, holds that wage differentials, when unimpeded by state distortions, reflect labour productivity differentials and promote an efficient allocation of labour resources. Within this framework individual contracting is typically seen as most beneficial (providing the greatest level of flexibility), although the recent OECD evidence raises questions about this. The social function derives from social wage theory, in which wage rates reflect both economic and social considerations -a combination of 'what the market will bear' and perceived 'fair' distributions of rewards (Blinder & Choi 1990) .
SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The management tool function emphasises management's strategic pay decisions and factors shaping their choice of pay instrument. Here, wages present an important tool for manipulation of labour. In one form of the efficiency wage literature, for example, 'union threat models' have emerged to explain strategies of matching or exceeding conditions obtainable by unions, to remove workers' incentive to organise (Dickens 1986 ,Corneoa & Luciforab 1997 . Individual contracting may provide a mechanism for paying a non-union premium and precluding collective bargaining (Brown et al. 1998; Dundon & Rollison 2004; Hearn Mackinnon 2007) .
Centralised wage systems, unions and collective bargaining are generally associated with more compressed wage structures (Freeman 1980; Metcalf 1982; Charlwood 2007) .
Evidence from the OECD shows increased wages dispersion within most OECD countries in recent years. Consistent with theory, it is particularly present in countries pursuing more flexible wage setting arrangements such as Australia (OECD 2004b: ch 3) . Between 1991 and 2005 the 90/10 earnings decile ratio increased by 11 per cent (from 2.8 to 3.1) in Australia while the incidence of low pay increased by 14 per cent (from 13.9 to 15.9 percent).
Over the same period the 90/10 earnings decile in the UK widened by six per cent (to 3.6) while the incidence of low paid increased by eight per cent (to 20.9 per cent) (OECD 2008) .
Other aspects of the Australian wage structure show related trends, including a widening gender pay gap, particularly amongst part-time employees (Preston & Jefferson 2007) .
But if greater individualisation of pay leads to greater pay dispersion, is this a bad thing? Does individualisation promote more efficient resource allocation, as per the 1990s OECD model, to unleash constraints on efficiency, leading to higher productivity and hence wages?
This rationale was advanced by Australian policy makers to justify the 'WorkChoices' reforms (eg Andrews ,2006 . This might appear counter to many studies from the USA, Britain, Australia and elsewhere showing unions obtain higher wages for members than nonmembers achieve, though the size of the union premium appears to be declining over time (Freeman & Medoff 1984; Miller & Rummery 1989; Christie 1992; Kornfeld 1993; Baarth, Raaum & Naylor 1998; Hildreth 2000; Wooden 2000; Fang & Verma 2002; Forth & Millward 2002; Blanchflower & Bryson 2003) . British evidence from Charlwood (2007) suggested little difference in most performance indicators between workplaces that maintained and those that abandoned collective bargaining in favour of individualised approaches. Where there were differences, workplaces that had abandoned collective bargaining had weaker improvements in productivity. Does individual contracting offer an assumed 'efficiency wage' benefit, in that employers pay a premium in the belief that they will reap benefits from having a non-unionised workforce? Or does individualisation increase dispersion because workers with less skill and bargaining power lose out due to widening power gaps under individualisation?
Our study of Australian data does not seek in the space available to systematically answer all these questions, but it touches aspects of each and raises points about the interpretation of studies of union wage effects. We undertake this analysis in the context of the 'WorkChoices' reforms, which took effect two months before the data were collected. These reforms are described elsewhere in this volume (Bailey, Mourell & Wilkinson 2009) There are two types of individualisation observable in EEH: formalised, through the use of statutory individual contracts such as AWAs; and very broadly defined 'individual arrangements'. The former is a subgroup of the latter. The latter also includes 'common law' contracts where pay is above the minimum set out in tribunal awards or collective agreements and some employees who have no underpinning award. Common law contracts had existed since the foundation of the Australian system over a century ago, whereas AWAs were a new form of flexibility. While some employers since the 1990s have used common law contracts to try to circumvent union coverage, there were limits to their usefulness, because no aspect of their pay and conditions could legally be below those stated in awards or agreements.
Because of this 'floor', Australian common law contracts do not offer a true insight into the impact of individual bargaining on pay and conditions, and are not really comparable to individual contracts in Britain. The flexibilities provided by AWAs are a closer approximation of the freedom of contracting available to British employers operating outside collective bargaining. So, while we use both indicators of individualisation in the first table, which summarises some general patterns, when we discuss earnings through the rest of the article, we focus on the effects of the statutory form, AWAs, through which employers had freedom to choose or negotiate the conditions they sought. We wish to compare workers on AWAs with workers on collective agreements.
EEH is the most reliable source of data on earnings of employees under AWAs (McIlwain 2006) . However, we need to interrogate unpublished data from it, as the published data do not separately identify workers on AWAs (ABS publications do not distinguish them from the far less common individual contracts registered under Labor-governed state systems, with far more stringent requirements). Our focus is on hourly cash earnings of non-managerial employees (the ABS does not collect data on hourly earnings for managerial employees).
Unfortunately, the data did not permit us to undertake multivariate analysis that could for employee characteristics such as age, qualifications and experience .
We compare AWAs with registered collective agreements (referred to as CAs). However, another weakness in the data is that they do not distinguish between union and non-union collective agreements CAs. Unlike in most countries, a 'collective agreement' in Australia can be negotiated with a group of employees without union representation. It can just be presented to them, to vote on. Over one in ten employees on collective agreements are on non-union agreements. Non-union CAs incorporate, on average, lower wage increases than union CAs, and in industries such as retail trade and hospitality substantially weaker employment conditions. They were often used to substitute or provide transition onto AWAs A final limitation is that most wage data are expressed as averages, which can be biased by inclusion of a few observations of employees with very high earnings. A more representative indicator of the situation of the 'typical' worker is provided by median earnings, and we use these where available -at the aggregate level.
FINDINGS Productivity, earnings and individual contracting
Before examining hourly earnings under collective agreements and individual contracts, we first overview industry level patterns in individual agreement coverage, union density, and growth in hourly earnings and labour productivity. Results are in Table 1 , which includes Pearson correlations of two measures of individual agreements -AWA coverage, and growth in all individual arrangements (including common law contracts), from the EEH surveywith union density, hourly earnings and productivity growth. The data cover from 2000 (when EEH survey data on individual agreements were first available) to 2006 (the latest EEH data we had access to at time of writing). Two sources of data on hourly earnings growth are used: EEH and the ABS Labour Price Index which, unlike EEH, controls for compositional changes within an industry and so is considered a more reliable indicator of change. Several observations can be made. First, both measures of individual agreement-making were related to declining union density, consistent with workplace survey data suggesting a negative relationship between individual 'bargaining' and union membership (Wooden 1999) . Several industries with active union avoidance behaviour by employers had both large drops in union density and a high incidence of AWAs (mining, communication) 
Firm size and agreements
There was a stark relationship between the ratio of earnings under AWAs to earnings under Retail trade also had a high AWA/CA ratio (1.18). This partly reflected the structure of retail awards and collective agreements, under which employees earning above a certain level are 'exempt' from the instrument (Price 2004 ). More importantly, retail trade, along with hospitality, is an industry where many non-union 'collective' agreements cut pay and conditions (Evesson et al. 2007 ), suppressing mean CA earnings. productivity. This scepticism arises from: the poorer overall wage outcomes for workers under AWAs; the poor productivity performance of the Australian economy during a period in which individual contracting, particularly through AWAs, grew and was actively promoted; the lack of a consistent inter-industry correlation between individual contracting and productivity growth shown in Table 1 ; and the low take-up of AWAs, outside two or three industries, by comparison with earlier expectations (cf Hamberger 1995) despite a decade of availability, which suggests little benefit for most employers from deploying them.
This lack of a positive link between individual contracting and productivity is consistent with other research in Australia and New Zealand (Gilson & Wagar 1996; Dalziel 2002; Hull & Read 2003; Dalziel & Peetz 2008) and with British experience (Charlwood 2007) . It is also consistent with the international literature which tends to suggest that unions probably have little or no net effect on productivity, and any impact is contingent on circumstances ( This contingency should not surprise us: other research also indicated there were different types of AWAs that focused on different issues, (Cole, Callus & Van Barneveld 2001) . It is consistent with an earlier survey comparing employees on AWAs with a control group, which showed perceived effects of AWAs varied greatly according to employees' position in the labour market. AWA employees in managerial and professional occupations (the highest skill group) were quite satisfied, while those in other occupations were dissatisfied on several key issues, by comparison with workers not on AWAs (Peetz 2004) . Labour market position appears to be a factor explaining some of the patterns we observe here too.
The other key factor helping explain outcomes is union avoidance behaviour -employers offering a non-union premium to employees through individual contracts, a form of assumed 'efficiency wage' to avoid the loss of control collective bargaining might bring. AWAs generally paid above CAs in industries where union avoidance strategies are important and below CAs in industries where labour cost minimisation was important. The findings on size are also consistent with the idea AWAs are frequently used for cost cutting or union avoidance. Very large firms and federal government departments had the resources and sophistication to mount concerted union avoidance strategies, offering wage premiums to induce workers to sign AWAs and/or financially penalising those who seek to remain on collective agreements. As economies of scale encourage unions to concentrate organising efforts in large firms, union density is on average higher there (eg Millward & Stevens 1986; Hundley 1989; Visser 1991) , so large firms have a stronger incentive to devote resources to non-union premiums. Indeed there is British and US evidence that union density, after mostly rising with size, decreases again in very large firms which have large human resource management capacities to discourage unionisation (Bain & Elias 1985; Hirsch & Berger 1984) .
Some large firms are prominent in industries featuring high AWA premiums (communications, finance and government administration). The AWA/CA ratio is considerably higher in the top industries identified as union avoiders, and in the largest firms with the greatest incentive to engage in union avoidance, than it is in the top occupations identified as having high skills.
Small firms are not likely to follow this approach, as threat of unionisation is low. They appear more likely to use AWAs for cost minimisation, presumably through cutting penalty rates, overtime pay and other 'protected' award conditions. The prevalence of such costcutting should not be underestimated. In the period May-September 2006, some 76 per cent of AWAs abolished shiftwork loading, 68 per cent of AWAs abolished penalty rates and 52
per cent abolished overtime pay (Davis 2007) . This changing of ways in which workers are paid for the time they work is observed in other research on individual contracting in Australia and New Zealand (Mitchell & Fetter 2003; Dannin 1997; Oxenbridge 1999 ).
Qualitative studies, too, showed effects of WorkChoices to be 'uneven, impacting on workers differently depending on their location in particular occupations and sectors' (Charlesworth & McDonald 2007) . For more vulnerable workers, including women and workers in retail and hospitality, effects included reduced conditions and power (Elton et al. 2007; Evesson et al. 2007) . It is consistent with such literature that our data show the lowest skill occupation group had the worst outcomes for workers on AWAs, while occupations with the most market power had relatively good outcomes. AWA wage shortfalls are also apparent in small firms and in sectors with low worker bargaining power such as health and community services (which includes aged care and child-care). We attribute these outcomes to the use of AWAs as a cost-cutting measure. The impact of individual contracting also appeared worse on average for women than for men, probably because of the industries and occupations in which they worked.
Structural factors also played a role in explaining patterns in specific industries. Examples include the use of exemption clauses in retail trade, the hiring of staff in high-salary areas in finance on AWAs, and the strong bargaining power of unionised workers in coal mining and emergency services.
CONCLUSIONS
Our findings are qualified by the facts that we were unable to apply multivariate techniques to control for individual characteristics, and that the collective agreement stream data include many employees who are on non-union agreements. This latter qualification, however, tends to strengthen our conclusions, as it leads to understatement of wages under collective agreements.
If there were 'flexibility' benefits for employees and employers through individual contracting, they were not apparent in these data at either aggregate or disaggregated levels.
We found nothing to suggest that individual contracting, by increasing productivity, led to generally higher wages than would occur under collective bargaining. For the typical worker (that is, the median employee), the reverse was the case. The median AWA shortfall of 15 to 16 per cent over the two years suggested cost-minimisation was an important element in individual contract strategies, and any 'flexibility' benefits that existed were not enough to offset the cost-minimisation effects on wages. Overall, AWAs were commonly associated with poorer outcomes for 'typical' employees than collective agreements. Policy institutions clearly matter in shaping wage outcomes.
The findings are consistent with the view that individual contracting is heterogeneous (eg Cole et al. 2001) and 'optimal for those with bargaining power, but an inadequate solution for employees without bargaining power as it can be used to undermine labour standards ' (van Wanrooy et al. 2007 ). Its effects, by comparison with collective agreements, vary according to reasons for introduction and labour market characteristics. Employers may have paid nonunion premiums (and/or apply penalties for not signing AWAs) where they use individual contracts to avoid unions. However, where organisations did not perceive a union threat effect, such as in most small firms, and were focused on cost minimisation, registered individual contracts were commonly used to reduce average pay and conditions as the legal environment permitted. Most affected were workers whose skills were not unique and who had limited bargaining power. For these workers, individual contracting represents a transfer of power from labour to capital.
Our findings imply that part of the reason for the widening dispersion of earnings under individual contracting is that workers with less skill and bargaining power in the labour market lose power, relative to those with highly sought after skills who are in position to obtain higher benefits through individual contracting. Another reason for the widening dispersion appears to be the offering of a non-union premium in response to a union threat effect, specifically in situations where the threat of unionism is real and workers have some individual bargaining power. The importance of employer strategies is highlighted by the greater variability of AWA/CA ratios by firm size and industry than by employee skill level.
Again, the limitations of the dataset mean we must be cautious in interpreting this difference, but they point to the need to take account of union threat and avoidance effects in explaining how individual contacting affects the earnings distribution. This in turn suggests that models of union wage effects which do not take account of union threat effects on non-union wages will understate the true impact of unions on wages. Conversely, models of the impact of individual contracting on wages will understate the negative effect of individual contracting, compared to collective bargaining, unless they take account of the heterogeneity of individual contracting, including its role in responding to union threat effects.
